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1 Introduction
Fiscal decentralization is an important feature of modern public finance. In 2014, local gov-
ernments accounted on average for a third of consolidated government spending in OECD
countries, ranging from 7% in Greece to 69% in Canada. The most decentralized policy areas
are housing and community services, followed by the environment, education, leisure, culture
and religion (Blo¨chliger and Kim, 2016). Decentralization has many advantages,1 but it can
also lead to technical and fiscal externalities. In this paper, we focus on their combined effect by
introducing spatial externalities (“spillovers”) into a tax competition model. We compute the
equilibrium outcome under different assumptions about the commitment ability of the central
government, and about the type of available policy instruments.
Some decentrally provided public goods are characterized by inter-regional spillovers, which
introduces a scope for horizontal strategic behavior by regional and local governments. Exam-
ples for such technical externalities include environmental regulation that also affects neigh-
boring regions, fire protection measures that mitigate the risk of a wildfire spread across juris-
dictions, infrastructure projects that can also be used by people who do not pay taxes in the
jurisdiction that financed them, or economic-geography effects such as clusters of research and
development that could affect growth in nearby regions.2 If local governments do not consider
the benefit to residents from other jurisdictions, they will under-provide the public good rela-
tive to what would be socially optimal (Williams, 1966; Oates, 1999; Wellisch, 1994; Lockwood,
1999; Bloch and Zenginobuz, 2007).
A related yet qualitatively different problem are fiscal externalities, which arise if local
governments tax a mobile tax base. For example, when taxing capital employed in a region,
local governments tend to ignore the benefit in other regions when they consider a marginal
increase in the tax rate that induces a capital outflow, which results in tax rates that are
inefficiently low (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wildasin, 1989).3 A fiscal externality can also
1Abstracting from interregional spillovers, decentralization can enhance or hinder efficiency depending on
the context. Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) measure the determinants and the demand for decentralization in
different contexts. From a political economy point of view, the principal (voters) can control the performance
of the agent (government) better if the latter is local, which can lead to a better government performance and
increased happiness(Voigt and Blume, 2012).
2Spillovers can consist of public goods produced in one jurisdiction “spilling out” to other jurisdictions
(e.g., flood protection measures that also protect jurisdictions located downriver), or the population of other
jurisdictions “spilling into” a jurisdiction to consume a public good good (e.g., the visiting a subsidized opera
house or sports stadium).
3See Wilson and Wildasin (2004), Fuest et al. (2005) and Keen and Konrad (2013) for comprehensive surveys
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arise in the context of residence-based tax competition (typically, such taxes apply to property
or income), in which households do not consider their fiscal impact on others when moving to
a jurisdiction; for a review, see Brlhart et al. (2015).
Some previous models have combined technical and fiscal externalities into a single frame-
work. Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002) show that in the presence of (positive) spillovers, the
inefficiency from inter-regional capital tax competition is mitigated, and Kuhlmey and Hinter-
mann (2019) find qualitatively similar results in the context of tax-induced Tiebout sorting.
The underlying intuition is that a share of the tax base that relocated to other regions “spills
back” into the home jurisdiction in the form of public consumption. Although technical and
fiscal externalities can exactly offset each other in special cases (see, e.g., Pinto, 2007; Eichner
and Runkel, 2012; Ogawa and Wildasin, 2009), the coexistence of both types of externalities
is generally associated with an inefficient outcome (Oates and Schwab, 1988; Fell and Kaffine,
2014). In a model that uses labor as the mobile factor (rather than capital as in this pa-
per and most of the literature), Bloch and Zenginobuz (2015) show that the inefficiency of
decentralization increases both with the degree of spillovers and the mobility of the population.
Most of the articles about tax competition use an international setting in which regions
compete against each other in the absence of a central government. In a federalist system,
the central government can address inefficiencies and redistributive concerns among regions by
means of corrective policies such as transfers and grants. However, federal transfers may cause
new distortions, especially if the central government is unable to commit to its policies.4 A lack
of federal commitment can be modeled using a Stackelberg game, in which local governments
act as leaders and the central government as a follower, which has given rise to the term
“decentralized leadership” (Silva and Caplan, 1997). This is closely related to the literature
concerned with “soft” budget constraints.5 In contrast, if the federal government can commit
to its policy, this is referred to “centralized leadership”. Federal commitment is often implicitly
on capital taxation.
4There are economic and political arguments for an inability to commit on behalf of the central government.
If the central government is benevolent and interested in maximizing total welfare, it might change from its
pre-specified policy if inefficiencies from local policy decisions are too large (Wildasin, 1999). Political motives
include reputation effects and the incentives to win votes by giving transfers to poorer regions (see Oates, 2005).
5Some of the literature labels the lack of commitment inability as a “soft budget constraint” (see Qian
and Roland, 1998; Goodspeed, 2002; Kornai et al., 2003). A soft budget constraint implies that the central
government is expected to increase subsidies in response to regional government taxes as it allocates these grants
in order to equalize marginal utilities of public good consumption across the federation. See Kornai et al. (2003)
for a more in-depth discussion of soft budget constraints.
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assumed when analyzing corrective policies (see, e.g., Wildasin, 1989; DePeter and Myers,
1994; Dahlby, 1996; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Ogawa, 2006). Empirical evidence for whether
the federal government can or cannot commit is inconclusive (see, e.g., Hayashi and Boadway,
2001), and the reality often lies between these polar cases: Although we do observe that central
governments “bail out” regions or member states, marginal public consumption is arguably not
equalized within federations, as would be predicted under a model of decentralized leadership.
Besides assumptions regarding commitment, the efficiency implications of a federal transfer
scheme depend on its specific form. Boadway (2004) differentiates federal transfers into two
broad categories: A “gross” scheme is characterized by transfers from the federal government
to the regions financed by a central tax, whereas a “net” scheme is self-financing in the sense
that it only consists of inter-regional transfers that must add up to zero.
In this paper, we analyze the interplay of technical and fiscal spillovers under both cen-
tralized and decentralized leadership and different federal transfer systems. We investigate the
conditions under which the social optimum can be implemented, and the sensitivity of the
outcome with respect to the strength of inter-regional spillovers. Whereas some of the results
we derive have been previously reported, others are new to the literature, and we present them
in a series of propositions. Furthermore, by comparing the different outcomes within a single
framework, we facilitate a comparison and synthesis of the possible outcomes, and thus in-
crease our knowledge of the efficiency aspects of transfer schemes that aim to support public
production within a federation.
A number of previous papers have addressed the efficiency of decentralized public provision
in the context of strictly local public goods (Koethenbuerger, 2004; Breuille et al., 2010; Silva,
2016). Caplan et al. (2000) investigate the special case of a public good that is associated with
perfect spillovers (which makes it a “global” public good) and prove that under decentralized
leadership and a net transfer scheme, the outcome can be efficient. As shown by Akai and
Sato (2008), the efficiency property hinges on the assumption of perfect spillovers. Throughout
the paper, we allow for the entire range between zero and perfect spillovers, and our results
therefore include those of Koethenbuerger (2004) and Caplan et al. (2000) as special cases.
We focus on public goods that convey a positive externality and thus abstract from situations
where public production negatively affects utility in neighboring jurisdictions.6
6Bondarev et al. (2017) examine the choice between different types of public goods, some of which may
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Our paper shows that the efficiency of the outcome crucially depends on the federal commit-
ment ability and the available transfer system. Several results emerge from the paper. We find
that an inability to commit on behalf of the central government leads regions to free-ride on
the tax revenue of other regions via the federal transfer scheme, but that spillovers to other re-
gions are internalized by the regional governments when they optimize their public production.
Intuitively, regions anticipate that the federal government will redistribute to the point where
public consumption is equalized, conditional on inter-regional spillovers, such that regions can-
not make themselves better off by under-providing the public good. If spillovers are perfect
in a decentralized leadership setting, no transfers are required to reach an efficient outcome.
A net equalizing transfer system complemented with private income redistribution equips the
federal government with an additional instrument. This can counteract the free-riding on fed-
eral transfers, as in Silva (2016). Since both private and public consumption are equalized ex
post by the federal government, the regional governments have an incentive to optimally tax
capital. In a gross transfer scheme, the federal government has two instruments as well which
ensures optimal public good provision. It does not matter for efficiency, if the federal tax is
individualized or uniform. However, with a uniform federal head tax, transfers are completely
financed by federal transfers whereas with an individualized federal tax, regional governments
set the optimal tax in line with a net equalizing transfer system complemented with private
income redistribution.
If the federal government can commit and uses a net transfer system, the solution is charac-
terized by the (inefficient) Nash equilibrium first derived by Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002).
In this situation, spillovers mitigate the inefficiency due to tax competition, but they lead
to free-riding on inter-regional public production. Efficiency can be restored by introducing a
matching grant, as shown by Ogawa (2006). However, this necessarily requires a separate source
of revenue for the federal government, as the matching grant itself cannot be self-financing.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present our framework. The Pareto-
optimal provision of public goods and the Nash equilibrium is rewiewed in Section 3. Section
4 contains our main results, first for the case of decentralized leadership, and second with the
roles reversed. The last section concludes.
convey negative externalities to other regions; however, they abstract from tax competition and thus from fiscal
externalities.
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2 Model
We model a competitive equilibrium describing a two-layer federalist economy, in which regional
governments raise revenue and provide public goods. Our model is based on the capital tax
competition models of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986) and Hoyt (1991). We
allow the public good to “spill” into other regions in the sense that the public good produced
in region i is consumed also in region j 6= i. There is no rivalry in consumption.7 The effect of
spillovers in the presence of capital tax competition has previously been analyzed by Bjorvatn
and Schjelderup (2002). We extend their “international” model by adding a federal government,
and by allowing for sequential policy setting rather than restricting it to be simultaneous.
There are n ≥ 2 regions (i, j = 1, ..., n with i 6= j). Each region contains a representative
household with identical preferences and an identical endowment of capital and labor. Each
region also contains one representative firm. These firms behave perfectly competitively and
use identical production technologies. The local governments choose their policies to maximize
the utility of the regional household. One federal government exists with the power to enforce
transfers between the regions and, in some settings, has the ability to raise revenue via a lump-
sum tax. Throughout the text, we use the terms “regional” and “local” interchangeably to
refer to the lower level of government and “central” or “federal” to refer to the upper level.
Capital is a productive factor that is mobile across regions, and regional governments tax it
to finance their expenditure.8 In addition, production relies on labor Li, which is immobile and
cannot be taxed by the regional governments.9 Households and firms act as price takers and
meet on the factor and consumption good markets. We normalize consumer prices by choosing
private consumption as the numeraire.
7For an analysis focusing on both spillovers and congestion, see Kuhlmey and Hintermann (2019).
8Capital is interpreted as physical capital (i.e. factories) and not as financial investments, which would
require a different type of model (in which the level of regional production would not depend on the level of
capital). Generally speaking, capital is interpreted as anything generating real output that is mobile across
regions; see Keen and Konrad (2013) for a discussion. We further refrain from modeling mobility costs of
capital.
9An alternative interpretation of Li would be land. The relevant assumption about this factor is immobility
across regions and that it does not serve as a regional tax base.
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2.1 Private production
The representative firm within each region produces one good, using capital and labor as
inputs. To simplify notation, we normalize production such that ki refers to capital per unit of
Li. The production function is continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave in ki, i.e.,
f ′(·) > 0 > f”(·). Capital is rented at the (federal) capital market price R and locally taxed
at ti, and labor is paid wage wi.
The profit-maximization problem of the representative firm in region i is given by
max
ki≥0
f(ki)− (R + ti)ki − wi ∀ i ∈ n.
Optimal production is characterized by
R + ti =
∂f(ki)
∂ki
, (1)
which implicitly defines the capital demand ki(R + ti) showing that the marginal products of
capital has to equal the price in terms of output.
Under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, revenue is fully exhausted for
factor payments such that profits in equilibrium are zero. This determines the equilibrium
compensation for Li (if this is labor, then wi is the wage):
wi = f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki . (2)
2.2 Public production
Regional governments have authority over tax collection and public good provision, and they
care about the utility of their residents only. Regional governments demand the produced good,
which is transformed into a local public good gi for their residents, i.e., they use a domestic
production technology which permits to produce one unit of the public good from one unit of
the consumption good ci such that f(ki) = ci+gi.
10 Public goods are financed by a source-based
10This means that the marginal rate of transformation between the private and the public good is equal to
one.
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tax on capital and the federal transfer si:
gi = tiki + si . (3)
The benevolent federal government implements a transfer system which can either be self-
financing (net transfer system) or financed by an additional federal tax (gross transfer system).
Regions count equally for overall welfare. With a net transfer system, transfers to one region
are financed by the negative transfers of other regions:11
n∑
i=1
si = 0 . (4)
The federal government can additionally be equipped with an explicit net transfer system
for income (as in Silva, 2016) defined by
n∑
i=1
τi = 0 , (5)
where τi is a lump-sum tax or transfer that applies to region i. Note that any symmetric
equilibrium under a net transfer system will be characterized by si = τi = 0 ∀ i.
With a gross transfer system, regional transfers are financed by a uniform federal lump-sum
tax T on private consumption:
n∑
i=1
si = nT . (6)
2.3 Market clearing
Public and private consumption are different uses of the same good and all after-tax income is
spent on private demand. The consumption good may be traded across regions. Market clearing
11Whether the individual transfers add to zero or some other value is immaterial, as long as this value is
fixed. The crucial point is that
∑
i dsi = 0 such that increasing the transfer to one reason requires a reduction
in the transfers for other regions; for a more general treatment with positive (but fixed) transfers, see Breuille
et al. (2010).
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requires that the output produced equals the demand for public and private consumption:12
n∑
i=1
f(ki) =
n∑
i=1
(gi + ci) . (7)
Firms in region i demand capital ki and households offer their capital endowment k¯i on the
federal market. Total aggregated capital supply
∑n
i=1 k¯i = K¯ is fixed at the federal level.
13 In
the free-trade equilibrium, capital endowed equals capital employed:
n∑
i=1
ki = K¯ . (8)
We restrict our attention to the case where the price for capital is always positive and capital
is thus fully employed.14 The capital tax of local governments increases firms’ rental price for
capital to R + ti. In equilibrium, the net return on capital determined by aggregated factor
market clearing has to hold in every region due to arbitrage:
R = f ′(ki)− ti = f ′(kj)− tj > 0 ∀ i, j . (9)
2.4 Comparative static effects under symmetry
Adopting the perspective of a specific region i and assuming the other regions to be identical,
a static analysis with respect to region i’s tax rate describes the general equilibrium structure
of the economy. Differentiating (8) with respect to ti yields:
∂K¯
∂ti
=
∂ki
∂ti
+ (n− 1)∂kj
∂ti
= 0, such that
∂kj
∂ti
= −( 1
n− 1)
∂ki
∂ti
.
The reaction of the capital price in response to region i’s capital tax rate is derived by
12With a perfectly competitive product market, condition (7) is always satisfied with identity. To see this,
substitute (1) and (2) into the LHS of (7), and substitute (3), (4) and (12) into the RHS, to get
∑
N wi + tiki +
Rki =
∑
N wi + tikiRk¯i. Since the sum of the employed capital (ki) has to equal the sum of available capital
(k¯i), the equilibrium condition (7) is always satisfied and can be ignored. Wilson (1987) modifies the model
and analyzes trade in two goods; for a modification with trade costs, see Becker and Runkel (2012).
13With a fixed capital supply (zero elasticity of supply), impacts of taxes are entirely felt by the aggregated
suppliers of capital (= all households) as R will respond to changes in t. Papers relaxing the assumption of
fixed capital supply include Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) and Eichner and Runkel (2012).
14It is never a dominant strategy for region i to raise its tax until R = 0, and we abstract from the possibility
that capital could be in excess supply, as in Bucovetsky (1991).
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differentiating (9):
∂R
∂ti
= f”(ki)
∂ki
∂ti
− 1 = f”(kj)∂kj
∂ti
< 0 .
Combing and imposing symmetry (i.e. ki = kj ≡ k) leads to the equilibrium conditions
previously identified by Koethenbuerger (2004):
∂ki
∂ti
= (
n− 1
n
)
1
f”(k)
< 0,
∂kj
∂ti
= − 1
n
1
f”(k)
> 0, and
∂R
∂ti
= − 1
n
< 0 . (10)
The set of equations (10) shows that there are two consequences to a change region i’s
tax rate: The region’s own capital demand is reduced, whereas the capital employed in other
regions increases via the decrease in the federal interest rate. The latter decreases with the
number of regions in the model. Intuitively, if region i increases its tax rate, capital moves out
of region i and flows into the other regions j 6= i until the marginal product of capital in all
regions is equal to the sum of the regional capital tax rate and the federal interest rate, R (eq.
9).
2.5 Consumption by households
The representative household in each region i obtains utility from private and public consump-
tion, which, in general, also depends on the public goods provided by other regions:
Gi = gi + β
n∑
m=1
m6=i
gm ∀i, β ∈ [0, 1] . (11)
The case β = 1 represents the situation of perfect spillovers (“federal” public good), whereas
β = 0 is the case of publicly provided private goods that has been the focus of most of the
previous literature. There is no congestion in public consumption.
Ui(ci, Gi) is strictly increasing, concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. Households
receive income Ii from capital endowment and fixed labor supply, which is entirely spent on
private consumption:
ci = Ii ≡ wi + k¯iR + τi − T (12)
where τi 6= 0 if there is a net transfer system for private income and T > 0 if there is a gross
transfer system. If the federal government uses a net transfer system without additional income
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redistribution, then τi and T are both zero.
3 Benchmark cases
In this section, we derive the outcome for the social optimum and the Nash equilibrium for
symmetric regions, two benchmark cases that have been considered in the previous literature.
Although our model contains a federal government, the benchmark results are identical to those
derived by Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002) in the absence of a federal government,15 and we
therefore keep the exposition brief.
3.1 Social optimum
To characterize the set of Pareto-optimal allocations, we use a model in which the federal
government acts as a benevolent social planner. It chooses ci and gi to maximize the welfare
in the federation, based on a utilitarian social welfare function, by solving:16
max
{c1...n},{G1...n},{g1...n}
n∑
i=1
Ui(ci, Gi) s.t. Gi = gi + β
n∑
m=1
m6=i
gm (13)
n∑
i=1
f(ki) =
n∑
i=1
(ci + gi) .
Imposing symmetry, defining the marginal rate of substitution between public and private
consumption as MRSi ≡ ∂Ui∂Gi/∂Ui∂ci and suppressing the subscript yields (for the intermediate
steps, refer to the Appendix A.1):
MRSPOi =
1
1 + (n− 1)β ∀ i . (14)
This implicitly defines the optimal tax rate tPO. Condition (14) states that a marginal
decrease in public consumption requires an increase of 1
1+(n−1)β in terms of private marginal
15If regions are not symmetric, the presence of a federal government affects the equilibrium outcome due to
the (nonzero) transfer that will co-determine consumption and production. However, the functional forms of the
optimality conditions would remain the same. In the social optimum, this is due to the fact that our benevolent
federal government simply takes the place of the social planner in Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002). For the
Nash equilibrium, any federal transfer is considered as given by the regional governments and thus drops out
of the first-order conditions.
16Because we focus on interior solutions, we abstract from the complementary slackness conditions. The
second-order conditions are negative and therefore consistent with a welfare maximum.
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consumption in order for utility to remain constant. Without spillovers (β = 0), the optimal
tax is set such that the MRS equates the marginal rate of transformation (MRT = 1) between
the public good and the private good in production. With β = 1, this collapses to the standard
Samuelson rule given by
∑n
i=1MRSi = MRT .
To gain more intuition, we assume that the federal government uses a self-financing transfer
according to (4) and specify the following utility function:
Ui(ci, Gi) = ln(ci) + ln
(
[tiki + si] + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
[tmkm + sm]
)
. (15)
If regions are symmetric, the self-financing transfer scheme is si = 0 ∀ i in equilibrium.
Taking the derivative of (15) with respect to ci and Gi, substituting into (14) and solving for
ti leads to the Pareto-optimal tax
tPO = c/k . (16)
Note that (16) depends on the model parameters via equilibrium consumption c, which is
a function of β, n, K¯ and the parameters of the production function.17
3.2 Nash Equilibrium
The second benchmark is the Nash equilibrium, in which the regional and federal governments
make their policy choices simultaneously (and cannot adjust them later). We assume that
regional governments optimize over taxes and that expenditures adjust residually after transfers
are received.18 The game can be separated into 2 stages. In the first stage, regional governments
17Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002) and Koethenbuerger (2004) use a quasi-linear utility function defined by
Ui(ci, Gi) = ci + ln
(
[tiki + si] + β
∑n
m 6=i [tmkm + sm]
)
. Using this in (14) and solving leads to the Pareto-
optimal tax tPO = 1/k, which is independent of β and n. However, this is due to the fact that the marginal
utility of income is constant with quasi-linear preferences, which is obviously a special case.
18Akai and Sato (2008) provide a comparison of expenditure and tax optimization in a decentralized leadership
game. Our setting, as well as that in Koethenbuerger (2004), Breuille et al. (2010) and Silva (2016) relate to
their scenario B, in which ti is decided ex-ante and gi adjusts ex-post. They find that a decentralized leadership
system in which taxes are the strategic choice variable leads to revenue-sharing due to local government’s free-
riding on tax collection efforts of others, in line with Koethenbuerger (2004) and our own results. In contrast,
when gi the choice variable, cost-sharing of expenditures leads to excessive expansion i.e. over-provision. The
intuition is that choosing gi leads to cost sharing of own expenditure with all other local governments (hence a
common pool problem). Ex post per capita transfers to regional governments are increasing in its expenditure
and decreasing when other regions spend more. As the ex post tax burden of each regional government depends
only on the economy-wide resource constraint, not on its own ex ante spending decisions. Akai and Sato (2008)
demonstrate that this fosters overspending ex ante. See Wildasin (1988) for a further discussion on how the
choice of strategic variable can influence the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we focus on regions setting ti.
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choose local taxes ti to maximize the utility of representative households. In this benchmark
scenario, the federal government implements a net transfer system (4), i.e., it chooses a lump-
sum transfer system si. All actors take the actions of the others as given and incorporate
the behavior of households and firms affected by their decision. In the second stage, firms
determine the demand for capital ki, produce output. Public production gi adjusts residually,
and public and private consumption takes place. Because this stage involves no policy choice,
we can suppress it in the analysis. The federal government’s maximization problem can be
written as follows:
max
{c1...n},{G1...n},{s1...n}
n∑
i=1
U(ci, Gi) (17)
s.t. Gi = tiki + si + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
tmkm + sm
n∑
i=1
si = 0
ci = f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki + k¯iR
The optimality conditions are given by:
U ′(Gi) + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
U ′(Gm) = U ′(Gj) + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=j
U ′(Gm) ∀ i, j. (18)
If regions are identical, these conditions simplify to:
U ′(Gi) = U ′(Gj) ⇒ Gi = Gj ∀ i, j . (19)
This condition states that public consumption is equalized across regions.19 From symmetry,
equations (19) and (4) imply that sNE = (n−1
n
)(tiki − tjkj), which is zero if all regions are
identical.20
19We would like to note that the equalization of public consumption is not the goal but a byproduct of utility
maximization. Transfers are chosen with the aim to maximize social welfare, and under symmetry, equalized
public consumption is implied.
20In symmetry, taxes are equal and consequently capital such that sNE is zero.
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The maximization problem faced by the regional governments is:
max
Gi,gi,ci,ti
U(ci, Gi) s.t. Gi = gi + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
gm (20)
gi = tiki + si
ci = f(ki)− f ′(ki)ki + k¯iR .
Solving this problem, imposing symmetry and using the capital market clearing conditions (10)
leads to the optimality condition given by (derivation in Appendix A.1)
MRSNE =
1
1− (1− β) , (21)
with  ≡ −∂ki
∂ti
ti
ki
= n−1
n
1
−f”(k)
t
k
> 0 representing the elasticity of region i’s capital demand
with respect to the tax rate. Because regions take the federal transfer as given in the Nash
game, si drops out of the first-order conditions, thus yielding the same result as in Bjorvatn
and Schjelderup (2002), where independent regions compete for a tax base in the absence of a
federal government.
Using the utility function in (15), substituting into the left-hand side of (21) and solving
for the resulting tax rate yields
tNE = tPO
1
[1 +DNE]
(22)
DNE ≡ β(n− 1) + (1− β)(n− 1
n
)
1
−f ′′(k)
1
k2
> 0 . (23)
The Nash equilibrium tax tNE is inefficiently low for n > 1. The expression for the distor-
tionary termDNE illustrates that the inefficiency stems from a convex combination of free-riding
and capital tax competition. Without spillovers, DNEβ=0 = (
n−1
n
) 1−f”(k)
1
k2
isolates the inefficiency
due to the fiscal externality. The fiscal externality arises because regions consider the capital
outflow out of their region as a cost when setting their tax rates, but fail to consider benefits
accruing to other regions (see also Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1985, 1986).
If spillovers are present, a β-fraction of the capital outflow spills back to region i in the
form of higher public good provision in the other regions. This is taken into account by region
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i when setting its tax rate. The response of the distortion to a marginal change in the level of
spillovers is given by:
∂DNEβ>0
∂β
= (n− 1)
(
1 +
1
n
1
f”(k)
1
k2
)
. (24)
If 1
n
1
|f”(k)|
1
k2
> 1, an increase of the spillover intensity decreases the distortion relative to the
Pareto-optimal tax. Intuitively, if |f ′′| is small, then a marginal change in the tax rate leads to
a relatively large outflow of capital in order to restore the equality ti+f
′ = R, whereas if |f ′′| is
large, the corresponding capital outflow is small. If tax competition (the second term in (23))
dominates the welfare loss, an increase in the level of spillovers improves efficiency because this
counteracts the fiscal externality. In contrast, if free-riding (the first term in (23)) is relatively
more important, then an increase in β reduces efficiency.
Note that the Nash result is qualitatively similar to Bloch and Zenginobuz (2015), who model
labor as an imperfectly mobile tax base and allow for inter-regional spillovers of the public good.
They find that the equililbrium tax rate is non-monotonic in the spillover parameter.21
4 Sequential policy setting
The Nash game gives valuable insights. However, in practice it is often the case that one level of
government can observe the decision of the other before making its own choice. We distinguish
between the polar cases of decentralized and centralized leadership, which we analyze in turn.
Within these cases, we derive the outcomes for different transfer systems available to the federal
government: (i) Gross vs. net systems; (ii) with and without additional redistribution of private
income; and (iii) lump-sum vs. matching grant. Figure 1 provides an overview of the cases
that we study. While some of the results in this section have been previously reported in the
literature (shaded boxes), other combinations are new (clear boxes).
21We refer to Bloch and Zenginobuz (2015), proposition 3. The equilibrium tax rate in their model depends
nonlinearly on the spillover parameter, as is the case here. Furthermore, the equilibrium tax rate decreases if
mobility increases, which is conceptually similar to the tax in the Nash equilibrium defined by (22)-(23). Here,
the tax decreases if capital is “more mobile”, meaning that |f ′′| is smaller (the more linear the production
function, the greater is the elasticity of regional capital demand with respect to the tax rate, ).
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Figure 1: Overview of policy scenarios of capital tax competition with public good spillovers
4.1 Decentralized leadership
If regional governments are allowed (or required) to define their policies first and are able to
fully commit to them, then they are policy leaders in a formal sense. Alternatively, regional
governments can also be de facto policy leaders if the federal government defines policy first,
but is unable to commit and thus adjusts its policy after observing the outcome of regional
policy choices. This is often discussed in the context of the federal government “bailing out”
regions despite having promised not to do so (Wildasin, 1999; Akai and Sato, 2008). If regions
anticipate that they have a “soft” budget constraint, they incorporate the federal government’s
response when setting the policy that maximizes their (regional) utilities.
To capture the idea that the federal government responds to regional governments’ choices,
we model the latter as Stackelberg leaders and the federal government as a Stackelberg follower.
In the first stage, regional governments select their taxes in order to finance public goods before
the central government decides on transfers in stage two. The game is solved by backward
induction and for different types of transfer systems.
4.1.1 Net single transfer system
In this first system that we consider, transfers are self-financing, and there is only one type of
transfer. In the second stage, the federal government chooses the level of transfers to maximize
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social welfare after observing the regional governments’ policy choices (i.e. maximization prob-
lem 17). Regions anticipate that transfers are a function of their own tax rates which will be
set such that 19 and the federal budget constraint (4) hold. This results in the same first-order
conditions as in solving the Nash equilibrium problem (17).
To derive the federal response to a marginal change in region i’s tax rate, we start by
differentiating (4):
∂si
∂ti
= −
∑
m6=i
∂sm
∂ti
= −(n− 1)∂sj
∂ti
, (25)
where the second equality is a consequence of imposing symmetry (m = j).
Differentiating (19) with respect to ti and canceling ∂
2U/∂G2i = ∂
2U/∂G2j due to symmetry
yields ∂Gi/∂ti = ∂Gj/∂ti. Using (25), the change in public consumption in region i as a
reaction to a change in the local tax rate is then given by:
∂Gi
∂ti
=
∂tiki
∂ti
+ β(n− 1)∂tjkj
∂ti
+ (1− β)∂si
∂ti
. (26)
The first term describes region i′s revenue effect when setting the tax ti; the second term
is the received “spill-back effect” of higher public good provision in other regions due to the
inflow of capital; and the third term captures the change in the federal transfer, again adjusted
for the degree to which this transfer spills out to other regions. With perfect spillovers (β = 1),
the spill-back effect is complete and no adjustment of the federal transfer is required.
The change in public consumption in region j in response to a change in the tax rate in
region i 6= j is given by
∂Gj
∂ti
=
∂(tjkj + sj)
∂ti
+ β
∂(tiki + si)
∂ti
+ β
∑
m6=i,j
∂(tmkm + sm)
∂ti
= (1 + β(n− 2)) ∂tjkj
∂ti
+ β
∂tiki
∂ti
− 1− β
n− 1
∂si
∂ti
, (27)
where symmetry is applied in the second line. Equating (26) and (27) and simplifying leads to
an implicit definition of the best-response function si(ti, tj):
(1− β)∂si
∂ti
= (1− β)n− 1
n
∂tjkj
∂ti
− (1− β)n− 1
n
∂tiki
∂ti
. (28)
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or, for β < 1,
∂si
∂ti
=
n− 1
n
(
∂tjkj
∂ti
− ∂tiki
∂ti
)
, (29)
which is identical to the function derived by Koethenbuerger (2004) in the absence of spillovers.
We now provide some intuition for why this is the case.
The transfer response function consists of two parts. The first term on the right-hand
side of (28) is positive and reflects the revenue increase in every other region in response to
region i’s tax increase. To maximize welfare (which, under symmetry, implies equalizing public
consumption across regions), the transfer to region i has to be increased. However, due to the
spillovers, region i only needs to receive a (1-β)-fraction of this surplus, as β spills over even in
the absence of federal redistribution. If β increases, more of the capital leakage spills back to
region i, and a smaller federal transfer is required. With perfect spillovers, the entire increase
in public good production spills back to i, rendering a transfer increase unnecessary.
The second term in (28) represents the local revenue increase in region i due to the tax
increase. As Gi = Gj will hold in the equilibrium, region i will only keep the part 1/n of
this revenue increase, whereas it has to surrender the remaining (n − 1)/n in the form of a
decreased federal transfer. However, due to the spillovers, region i already loses some of its
revenue increase, such that the reduction of the transfer only needs to be a (1-β)-fraction of it.
With β = 1, there is no need to reduce region i’s transfer as all other regions equally share the
benefits of the revenue increase.
Because not only public production, but also the transfer itself spills across regions (in the
form of public consumption), region i’s transfer has to be adjusted accordingly. For example,
with β = 0.5, the transfer change to region i has to be twice as high in order to achieve the
desired outcome. This is the reason why the spillover parameter cancels out in (29). Last, note
that with perfect spillovers, both sides of (28) are zero, indicating that any pattern of federal
transfers leads to the same outcome as all regions consume the (pure) public good equally
irrespective of where it is produced.22
In stage 1, regional governments maximize the utility of their residents. When setting the
optimal tax rate, they consider its effect on the choices made by the representative firm and
22If spillovers were asymmetric in the sense that βij 6= βji and/or βij 6= βim, for i 6= j, i 6= m, the spillover
parameters would not cancel. In this case, the best-response function would depend on the region in question,
and on the associated vector of spillover parameters.
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household in the region, as well as on the federal transfer:
max
ti
U
(
[f(ki)− f ′(ki)ki + k¯iR],
[
[tiki + si(ti, tm)] + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
[tmkm + sm(ti, tm)]
])
. (30)
The first-order conditions and the resulting optimality conditions are derived in the Appendix
A.2.1. We combine our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Decentralized leadership with single net transfer system for public production.
The decentralized equilibrium under decentralized leadership, with symmetric regions and trans-
fer system (4) is characterized by:
MRSDE =
n
1 + β(n− 1) = n ·MRS
PO . (31)
Proof: See Appendix A.2.1.
The MRSDE exceeds the first-best MRSPO for n > 1, such that the tax is set too low.
Under decentralized leadership, the federal transfer corrects for the distortions of capital outflow
triggered by capital tax competition and free-riding on the public goods of other regions, as can
be seen in (28). The distortion in the tax rate is introduced via the revenue-sharing transfer
system and the inability of the federal government to commit (i.e., it “bails out” regions by
ensuring equal public consumption everywhere). Expression (31) corresponds to the solution in
Koethenbuerger (2004), corrected for the presence of spillovers. If spillovers are perfect (β = 1),
the equilibrium collapses to the case of a federal public good and pure free-riding on transfers
first derived by Warr (1983).
Using the utility function defined by (15), we can solve (31) for the resulting tax rate in a
symmetric decentralized equilibrium:
tDE =
c
kn
=
tPO
n
. (32)
Intuitively, regional governments anticipate that the federal government will set transfers to
maximize utilities which leads to equalized public consumption in symmetry. They know that
they can only keep an n-fraction of the additional revenue from a tax increase, which results in
an under-provision of the public good. Importantly, this under-provision is unrelated to fiscal
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and environmental spillovers (which are internalized by the transfer), but is entirely due to the
tax-transfer system by the federal government.
4.1.2 Net transfer system with additional redistribution of income
In this subsection, we assume that the federal government has access not only to a transfer that
equalizes public consumption, but to an additional transfer targeting private consumption, as
defined by (5). Solving the federal government’s problem in stage 2 leads to (see Appendix
A.2.2):
U ′(Gi) = U ′(Gj) ⇒ Gi = Gj ∀ i, j , (33)
U ′(ci) = U ′(cj) ⇒ ci = cj ∀ i, j . (34)
The federal government chooses the two types of transfers such that the marginal utilites
of private and public consumption across regions are equalized. If regions are identical, this
implies equal private and public good consumption across regions. Together with the budget
constraints, this defines the federal policy program and consequently the reaction functions
si(ti, tj) and τ(ti, tj).
The reaction function of si is identical to the case without income distribution and is given
by (29), as public consumption is once again equalized according to (33). The reaction function
of the private consumption transfer is (derivation in Appendix A.2.2):
∂τi
∂ti
=
n− 1
n
k > 0 and
∂τj
∂ti
= − 1
n
k < 0 . (35)
Without a transfer, the marginal reduction of private income due to an increase in the tax
in region i would be given by k. Due to the transfer, region i receives n−1
n
k and all regions j
have to pay 1
n
k. Thus, the cost of substituting private with public consumption in a particular
region is shared evenly across all regions.
The decentralized equilibrium with additional redistribution of income is characterized by
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Decentralized leadership with an additional net income transfer system.
The symmetric equilibrium with spillovers under decentralized leadership, in which the federal
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government uses a net transfer system for public as well as private consumption, is Pareto-
optimal:
MRSDEI =
1
1 + (n− 1)β = MRS
PO . (36)
Proof: See Appendix A.2.2.
This means that the result by Silva (2016) for strictly local public goods also applies in
the presence of spillovers. Regional governments anticipate that the federal government equal-
izes both public and private consumption, inclusive of any spillover effects, and set optimal
tax rates.23 If the federal government can redistribute private income, in addition to public
consumption, the distortion from the revenue sharing system is removed.
4.1.3 Gross transfer system(s)
In comparison to the net transfer system, the ex post transfers in a gross transfer scheme are
financed by an additional federal tax. To abstract from issues related to vertical tax competition
(see, e.g., Dahlby and Wilson, 1994; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002), we assume this additional
tax to be a non-distortive head tax.24 We start by assuming that the federal budget constraint
is given by
∑n
i=1 si = nT , before extending the results to an individualized federal tax Ti and
an additional redistribution of income as in (5).
The federal government chooses the lump-sum tax (and hence the aggregated amount of
the transfer) and the distribution of transfers between the region. Solving the problem leads
to (see Appendix A.2.3):
U ′(Gi) = U ′(Gj)⇒ Gi = Gj ∀ i, j (37)
∂U
∂Gi
∂U
∂ci
=
1
1 + (n− 1)β = MRS
PO
i ∀ i (38)
Eq. (37) states that the federal government allocates transfers to equalize the marginal
utilities of public goods (again, with identical regions, this translates to the same level of public
23With a self-financing transfer system and symmetry, it must be that si = 0∀ i in equilibrium. In order to
supply the efficient amount of the public good, the regions have to set the tax rate to tPO.
24Given that all federal inputs are fixed in this model, this could be substituted by a federal tax on capital
or labor without loss of generality.
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consumption everywhere). Eq. (38) implies that adding a lump-sum tax provides the federal
governments with an additional policy instrument to achieve the efficiency condition of private
and local public good consumption, i.e., it ensures an optimal amount of public consumption
in each region. Due to symmetry, private consumption will be equalized as well.
To derive the best-response functions of the federal policy to a change in regional tax
rates, we differentiate the first-order conditions of the symmetric equilibrium with respect to
ti. Furthermore, from the federal budget constraint, it follows that
∂si
∂ti
= n
∂T
∂ti
− (n− 1)∂sj
∂ti
.
If region i changes the tax ti, then this will be compensated by a change in the lump-sum
tax T that is financed by all n regions, plus a change in transfers for all other n − 1 regions.
For β < 1,25 this leads to (see Appendix A.2.3):
∂si
∂ti
=
∂T
∂ti
− n− 1
n
(
∂tiki
∂ti
− ∂tjkj
∂ti
)
and
∂sj
∂ti
=
∂T
∂ti
+
1
n
(
∂tiki
∂ti
− ∂tjkj
∂ti
)
(39)
The second term of the reaction function is equivalent to that in the net transfer system
(29). This means that the federal government corrects for the distortions due to capital outflow
and free-riding on public goods, and that regions equally share the result of any local revenue
change. The difference to the net transfer system consists in the change in the federal tax T
due to a change in ti.
The equilibrium with a gross transfer system is characterized by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Decentralized equilibrium with a gross transfer system.
The symmetric equilibrium under decentralized leadership with spillovers, in which the federal
government uses a gross transfer system, is entirely financed by federal transfers and given by
MRSDEg = MRSPO
with ti = 0 ∀ i (40)
Proof: The first line of (40) is simply a restatement of (38). In a symmetric equilibrium,
25For β = 1, both sides of the reaction functions are zero, and again, as with a net transfer system (4.1.1),
any federal transfer will lead to the same outcome since all regions consume the “pure” public good.
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the federal government can achieve the social optimum by equalizing (the marginal utility of)
public consumption across regions and choosing an appropriate gross transfer T to achieve the
desired mix of public and private consumption.26 For the second part, consider the optimality
condition of the regional governments in stage 1 (the maximization problem is described in
Appendix A.2.3):
∂U
∂ti
=
∂U
∂ci
∂ci
∂ti
+
∂U
∂Gi
∂Gi
∂ti
≤ 0; ti ≥ 0; ∂U
∂ti
· ti = 0. (41)
For ti = 0, the first-order condition will generally not be equal to zero.
The effect of a marginal change in region i’s tax rate on public consumption, including the
reaction of the federal transfers, is given by
∂Gi
∂ti
=
∂tiki
∂ti
+
∂si
∂ti
+ β(n− 1)
(
∂tjkj
∂ti
+
∂sj
∂ti
)
= [1 + β(n− 1)]
(
∂T
∂ti
+
1
n
(
∂tiki
∂ti
+ (n− 1)∂tjkj
∂ti
))
(42)
where the second line follows from substituting (39).
Because conditions (37)- (38) hold, it must be that ∂Gi/∂ti = 0. Because the (efficient
and symmetric) outcome is given, the level of public consumption in each region cannot be
influenced by regions’ choice of the tax rate, as higher regional tax revenue will simply be
equalized by a reduction in the transfer. This implies that the federal government’s adjustment
of ∂T
∂ti
is such that the term in parenthesis is zero:
∂T
∂ti
= − 1
n
(
∂tiki
∂ti
+ (n− 1)∂tjkj
∂ti
)
= −k
n
(43)
where the last equality follows from substituting (10).
The marginal change in private consumption in region i in response to a unilateral marginal
26Conversely, we can state that with ex-ante identical regions, any non-symmetric outcome will not be efficient
as the federal government can only tailor si to individual regions, but not T . This means that the MRS cannot
be equalized across regions if regional tax rates differ. However, non-symmetric tax rates by ex-ante identical
regions will not constitute a Nash equilibrium in the first stage of the game and thus can be ruled out.
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increase of the regional tax rate is given by
∂ci
∂ti
= −f ′′(ki)∂ki
∂ti
ki +
∂R
∂ti
k¯i +
k
n
= −k · n− 1
n
< 0 . (44)
This implies that ∂Ui
∂ti
< 0, such that all regions would have an incentive to choose lower
capital tax rates. In other words, ti > 0 ∀ i cannot be a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the
first stage of the game, because regions would have an incentive to unilaterally reduce the tax
rate. Hence it follows that the only symmetric equilibrium tax rate is ti = 0 ∀ i. 
Proposition 3 describes the case where the regional transfers are financed by a federal tax
that is uniform across regions, and without an additional region-specific income transfer. The
following corollary relaxes these assumptions, building on Propositions 2 and 3:
Corollary 1 Extensions to the gross transfer system.
The symmetric equilibrium with a federal gross transfer system that
(i) finances transfers using individualized head taxes
(∑n
i=1 si =
∑n
i=1 Ti
)
or
(ii) uses additionally redistribution of income
(∑n
i=1 si = nT combined with
∑n
i=1 τi = 0
)
is Pareto-optimal. In both systems, the regional governments lose their fiscal power in the sense
that the equilibrium is independent of regional tax rates.
Proof: A gross transfer system financed by individual taxes (part i) is similar to a net trans-
fer system with additional redistribution of income as discussed in Proposition 2. The only
difference is that the budget constraints (4) and (5) do not individually have to be zero, but
their sum. This means that this is a relaxation of the situation described in section 4.1.2, and
therefore it has to result in an efficient outcome as well. Similarly, adding an additional income
transfer to a gross transfer system (part ii) is redundant with ex-ante identical regions, since
income redistribution already exists via the uniform federal tax. Therefore, the equilibrium has
to be efficient.
In both cases, the marginal utility is equalized across regions not only for public consump-
tion, but also for private consumption as a consequence of the federal government’s policy
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setting (with symmetric regions, this translates to public and private consumption being equal-
ized everywhere). This means that regional governments cannot affect the utility in their
jurisdiction by changing tax rates. Intuitively, if the government of region i were to increase
its tax rate on capital, the transfers si and/or τi would simply be adjusted downward, leaving
public and private consumption unchanged everywhere. Regional tax rates can therefore take
any value, unlike the case described in Proposition 3. For a more formal proof, see Appendix
A.2.3). 
4.2 Centralized leadership
We now turn to the case in which the federal government is able to commit to its policy
choices, regardless of regions’ decisions, and the latter know this. The roles are thus reversed:
We model the federal government as the Stackelberg leader and the regional governments as
followers that set their policy in the second stage conditional on the federal policy. In the first
stage, the federal government anticipates the response by the regional governments.
Unlike in the Nash equilibrium and in the decentralized leadership model, the form of the
transfer matters when the central government is the policy leader. In particular, the federal
government can either pay a lump-sum grant or a matching grant that is proportional to regions’
public production.27 In many federations, the transfer system has some degree of conditionality
as a device for federal influence over regional programs (Boadway and Tremblay, 2012).
A matching grant necessarily requires a gross transfer system, since public production will
be strictly positive, and the sum of payments thus cannot be zero. Therefore, a net transfer
system has to be based on lump-sum transfers (in the sense that they do not depend on
gi). Whether the transfers aim at public or private consumption is immaterial: All lump-sum
transfers will drop out of regions’ first-order conditions and thus the equilibrium under a net
transfer system and centralized leadership is the same as in the Nash setting discussed in section
3.2. The equilibrium is inefficient and characterized by (21), and under symmetry we have that
si = T = 0∀ i.
In the following, we analyze the equilibrium if the federal government has access to a
27For simplicity, we have modeled the grant as a lump-sum transfer above. In the Nash equilibrium, regional
governments take the money amount of the transfer as given, regardless of how this amount is determined. In
the decentralized leadership setting, the grant is chosen such that public consumption is equalized across regions
(Gi = Gj). Again, the form of the grant is immaterial.
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matching grant of the form
sMGi ≡ α · gi ∀i , (45)
with α > 0, which requires a separate source of revenue for the federal government. We specify
this source as a uniform head tax T .28 The entire revenue from this lump-sum tax is exhausted
by the transfer system:
n · T = α ·
n∑
i=1
gi . (46)
The timing of the centralized-leadership-game is as follows: In the first stage, the federal
government chooses a matching rate α. Because the federal government anticipates the reaction
of the regional governments, setting α defines T through (46). In the second stage, regional
governments choose capital taxes ti to maximize the utility of their resident households while
treating the matching rate as given.
We collect our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Centralized leadership
(i) If the federal government uses a lump-sum transfer, which is necessarily the case in a net
transfer system, the centralized outcome is characterized by the Nash equilibrium.
(ii) If the federal government has access to a matching grant that is financed via a federal
lump-sum tax, Pareto-efficiency can be induced by choosing the following matching rate:
αCE =
(n− 1)β + (1− β)
1 + (n− 1)β . (47)
with  representing the (absolute) elasticity of regional capital demand w.r.t. the tax rate.
(iii) If n > 1 and  < n−1
n
, an increase in spillovers increases the matching rate, and vice
versa.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
28Ogawa (2006) uses a region-specific tax Ti, but one that is not self-financing and therefore does not cor-
respond to the income-redistributing net transfer considered above (note that he does not discuss the issue of
commitment). The result is the same under symmetry, as all regions pay the same tax, but the outcome would
differ with asymmetric regions. Since both the population and the total amount of capital is held fixed, T could
also be specified as a tax on labor, or as a residence-based tax on capital k¯i.
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Expression (47) is equivalent to the result derived by Ogawa (2006) based on a matching
grant that is financed by region-specific lump-sum taxes (as opposed to the uniform federal
head tax considered here). The federal government sets the optimal matching rate α such that
the fiscal externality induced by capital tax competition and the technical externality due to
spillovers are both exactly internalized. The matching rate depends on the number of regions,
the elasticity of a region’s capital demand with respect to the tax rate, and the strength of the
spillover effect.
To gain some intuition, we start with the case of no spillovers. With β = 0, the matching
rate corrects for the fiscal externality from tax competition only (as there is nothing else to
correct): αCE
∣∣
β=0
=  = −∂ki
∂ti
t
k
= (n− 1)∂kj
∂ti
t
k
. The matching rate equals the marginal change
in tax revenue in all other regions (proportional to the employed capital) due to a marginal
increase in the tax in region i. This is the fiscal externality that local governments would not
consider in the absence of a federal matching rate, and which is the cause for the inefficiency
from capital tax competition (see, e.g. Wilson, 1999).
In the presence of spillovers, there is an additional reason to subsidize local public production
(the first part in the numerator of (47)), as regions do not consider the benefits of gi accruing
in regions j 6= i. This effect increases in the number of regions. However, a β-fraction of
the capital outflow spills back to region i in the form of higher public good provision in the
other regions (the second part in the denominator of (47)), such that spillovers reduce the fiscal
distortion. In other words, two things happen when β increases: First, the technical externality
due to free-riding increases (which requires a higher αCE), and second, the fiscal externality is
mitigated (which reduces the optimal matching rate). The net effect depends on the relative
importance of the technical and fiscal externalities. Part (iii) of Proposition 4 states that if the
elasticity of capital demand is not too large ( < n−1
n
), the second effect dominates, such that
the optimal matching rate decreases in β, and vice versa for large .
Note, finally, that providing the federal government with a matching grant makes no dif-
ference in the absence of commitment (decentralized leadership), as the regions anticipate the
total transfer si that will result in Gi = Gj, regardless of its composition.
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4.3 Discussion
Figure 2 provides and overview of our results. We find that the social optimum can be achieved
with and without federal commitment, depending on the available policy instruments.
Figure 2: Overview of models and results
If the federal government cannot commit, then the result is inefficient under a single net
transfer system. Efficiency can be obtained if there are two types of self-financing transfers:
One for public consumption, and a separate transfer for the numeraire consumption good.
These two results are qualitatively similar to previous results derived for the special case of
strictly local public goods by Koethenbuerger (2004) and Silva (2016). Intuitively, the transfer
depends on equilibrium public consumption in each region, and thus fully incorporates not only
the presence of capital outflow but also of spillovers. The presence of spillovers changes the
equilibrium tax rate, but the qualitative nature of the results are the same as in the case of
publicly provided private goods.
If the federal government uses a gross transfer system such that region-specific transfers
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are financed by a uniform federal tax, the outcome is efficient, but financed entirely by federal
transfers. Regional government do not have an incentive to set ti > 0 as they anticipate that
they are “bailed out” by the federal government setting transfers si and the tax T such that
efficiency is reached. A gross transfer system with an individualized federal tax Ti (or with
additional redistribution of income) is efficient as well, but such a system renders the regions
powerless in the sense that the equilibrium outcome is independent of regions’ tax rates.
If the federal government is able to commit to its policy choices, the equilibrium coincides
with the (inefficient) Nash equilibrium unless the government has access to matching grants.
These grants have to be financed via some other source of revenue and therefore cannot be
revenue neutral. The effect of the spillover parameter on the optimal matching rate depends on
the elasticity of capital demand with respect to the tax rate. If the demand for regional capital
is elastic, the detrimental effects of capital tax competition dominate the efficiency loss. Since
spillovers cause a part of the capital outflow to spill back into the region of origin, they mitigate
the inefficiency from decentralization and thus lead to a decrease in the optimal matching rate.
In contrast, if regional capital is not very responsive to regional tax rate differentials, then an
increase in spillovers increases regions’ incentives to free-ride. To counteract this, the federal
government has to increase the matching rate.
5 Concluding remarks
We develop a model of capital taxation within a federation, in which the regionally provided
public goods are allowed to spill across regions. We ask two questions: (i) To what extent does
the presence of spillovers affect the inefficiency associated with decentralized decision-making,
and (ii) how does this depend on the ability of the federal government to commit to a policy
as well as on the available policy instruments? Our paper synthesizes the literature on capital
tax competition in the presence of spatial externalities by reproducing the previous results
as special cases (i.e., in the absence of spillovers), and generates new results within the same
framework.
Because the federal government cares about the welfare of all households within the fed-
eration, it may not be able to commit to its policy but instead ends up bailing out regions.
Whether this leads to an inefficient outcome depends on the available policy instruments. Sim-
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ilarly, the outcome can be efficient or inefficient if the federal government can commit. In this
sense, commitment is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for efficiency, or lack thereof,
in the context of decentralized public production. This contrasts with the implications of the
literature on soft budget constraints, which has argued that (i) federal commitment is required
for efficiency but (ii) is likely to be absent.
Throughout this paper, we assume that regions are symmetric, which is a routine assump-
tion in the literature. This allows us to generate closed-form results, but it naturally is a poor
description of reality, where large and small regions compete with each other for a mobile tax
base. We furthermore abstract from asymmetric information, which is the principal motivation
for the decentralized provision of public goods in the first place. If the federal government is
benevolent and fully informed, decentralization can only lead to an efficiency loss by construc-
tion. Our paper shows how this efficiency loss changes if we allow for spillovers. If the benefits
of decentralization also depend on the presence of spillovers, they have to be considered along
with the costs when deciding about decentralizing government functions and transfer systems
in a federation. We believe this to be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Benchmark cases
The solution to the maximization problem (13) can be found by substituting the definition for
Gi into the utility function and form the Lagrangian:
max
{c1...n},{g1...n}
L = Ui
ci, gi + β n∑
m=1
m 6=i
gm
+ n∑
j=1
j 6=i
Uj
cj, gj + β n∑
m=1
m 6=j
gm
− λ n∑
i=1
(f(ki)− ci − gi) .
Taking the derivatives w.r.t. to ci and gi (which produces 2n first-order conditions) and rear-
ranging them leads to the following n optimality conditions:
∂Ui
∂ci
=
∂Ui
∂Gi
∂Gi
∂gi
+
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
∂Uj
∂Gj
∂Gj
∂gi
∀ i. (A.1)
At the optimum, the change in the marginal utility of private consumption has to equal
the change in the marginal utility of public good consumption for each region. Imposing sym-
metry, defining the marginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption as
MRSi ≡ ∂Ui∂Gi/∂Ui∂ci and suppressing the subscript yields expression (14). Finally, substituting
∂U/∂c = 1/c and ∂U/∂G = 1/G and equating with (14) leads to the optimal tax given by (16).
The Nash equilibrium is derived by rearranging the first-order condition from (20) to:
MRSi ≡
∂U
∂Gi
∂U
∂ci
= −
∂ci
∂ti
∂Gi
∂ti
. (A.2)
The marginal effect of taxes on consumption (income) is:
∂ci
∂ti
= −f ′′(ki)∂ki
∂ti
ki +
∂R
∂ti
k¯i . (A.3)
The effect on income is separated into the effect on wage income (first term) and capital in-
come (second term), both of which are negative. Increasing taxes increases public consumption
at the cost of private consumption. The derivative of public good consumption with respect to
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the tax rate is given by:
∂Gi
∂ti
= ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
+ β
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
∂tjkj
∂ti
. (A.4)
The first term is the mechanical increase in tax revenue if the tax rate is marginally raised,
holding capital fixed. The second term is negative and captures the outflow of capital to
other regions in response to a marginal tax increase in region i. This negative cost is however
dampened by positive spillovers from other regions (third term). Substituting (A.3) and (A.4)
into (A.2) yields:
MRSNEi =
f ′′(ki)∂ki∂ti ki − ∂R∂ti k¯i
ki +
∂ki
∂ti
ti + β
∑n
j=1
j 6=i
∂kj
∂ti
tj
. (A.5)
Imposing symmetry and using the capital market clearing conditions (10), we obtain the
MRS which defines the Nash equilibrium in (21).
A.2 Decentralized leadership
A.2.1 Net single transfer system: Proof of Proposition 1
The optimality condition from solving (30) is given by:
∂Ui
∂Gi
∂Gi
∂ti
= −∂Ui
∂ci
∂ci
∂ti
. (A.6)
The marginal change in private consumption is
∂ci
∂ti
= −f ′′(ki)∂ki
∂ti
ki +
∂R
∂ti
k¯i = −k , (A.7)
where the last equality follows from substituting (10).
The marginal change in public consumption for region i is
∂Gi
∂ti
=
∂tiki
∂ti
+
∂si
∂ti
+ β(n− 1)
(
∂tmkm
∂ti
+
∂sm
∂ti
)
=
∂tiki
∂ti
+ β(n− 1)∂tmkm
∂ti
+ (1− β)(n− 1
n
)
(
∂tmkm
∂ti
− ∂tiki
∂ti
)
=
1 + β(n− 1)
n
(
∂tiki
∂ti
+ (n− 1)∂tmkm
∂ti
)
=
1 + (n− 1)β
n
k , (A.8)
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where we used (29) (second line), collected terms (third line) and substituted the capital market
clearing conditions (10) (fourth line). The change in mobile capital in region i and regions m 6= i
as a response to the change in ti cancels out in equilibrium due to the federal transfer setting:
∂tiki
∂ti
+ (n− 1)∂tmkm
∂ti
= k +
n− 1
n
1
f”(k)
t− n− 1
n
1
f”(k)
t = k .
What remains is the additional positive tax revenue-effect to region i given by k. Expression
(31) follows directly from substituting (A.8) and (A.7) into (A.6) 
A.2.2 Net transfer system including private income redistribution
In stage 2, the maximization problem of the federal government is given by:
max
{G1...n},{s1...n},{τ1...n},{g1...n},{c1...n}
n∑
i=1
Ui(ci, Gi) s.t. Gi = gi + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
gm (A.9)
n∑
i=1
si = 0
n∑
i=1
τi = 0
gi = tiki + si
ci = f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki + k¯iR + τi .
Substituting the regional governments’ and households’ budget constraints, the Lagrangian
and the first-order conditions can be written as
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max
{s1...n},{τ1...n}
L =
n∑
i=1
Ui
(
f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki + k¯iR + τi, tiki + si + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
tmkm + sm
)
+ λ
n∑
i=1
si + µ
n∑
i=1
τi (A.10)
∂L
∂si
=
∂U
∂Gi
+ β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
∂U
∂Gm
+ λ = 0 ∀i (A.11)
∂L
∂τi
=
∂U
∂ci
+ µ = 0 ∀i (A.12)
∂L
∂λ
=
n∑
i=1
si = 0 (A.13)
∂L
∂µ
=
n∑
i=1
τi = 0 . (A.14)
Using (A.11) for regions i and j 6= i, combining and imposing symmetry yields (33). Equa-
tion (34) is derived in the same manner using (A.12) for regions i and j. Finally, the reaction
function for private consumption transfers can be found using (34) and the federal budget
constraint (A.14) :
f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki + k¯iR + τi = f(kj)− ∂f(kj)
∂kj
kj + k¯jR + τj (A.15)
τi = −(n− 1)τj or τj = − 1
n− 1τi . (A.16)
Using (A.14) and (9) in (A.15) and differentiating with respect to ti yields:
f ′′(ki)
∂ki
∂ti
(k¯i − ki)− k¯i + ∂τi
∂ti
= f ′′(kj)
∂kj
∂ti
(k¯j − kj)− 1
n− 1
∂τi
∂ti
Substituting (10) and solving for ∂τi
∂ti
and using it in (A.16) as well yields the reaction function
(35).
Proof of Proposition 2:
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In the first stage, regional governments solve:
max
Gi,gi,ci,ti
U(ci, Gi) s.t. Gi = gi + β
n∑
m=1
m6=i
gm
gi = tiki + si
ci = f(ki)− f ′(ki)ki + k¯iR− τi
with si = si(ti, tj); sj = sj(ti, tj); τi = τi(ti, tj) .
Solving the model results in the same optimality condition as in the Nash equilibrium, given
by (A.2). The change in private consumption is given by
∂ci
∂ti
= −f ′′(ki)∂ki
∂ti
ki +
∂R
∂ti
k¯i − ∂τi
∂ti
= − 1
n
k , (A.17)
where the last equality follows from substituting (10) and (35). The change in public consump-
tion with respect to ti is equivalent to (A.8). Using (A.17) and (A.8) in (A.2) leads to (36).

A.2.3 Gross transfer system(s)
The federal government chooses both T and the region-specific transfers si to maximize total
welfare. After substituting the budget constraints, the Lagrangian can be written as:
max
{s1...n},T
L =
n∑
i=1
Ui
(
f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki+ k¯iR−T ; tiki+si+β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
tmkm+sm
)
+λ
( n∑
i=1
si−nT
)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier of the federal budget constraint. The first-order conditions
are given by:
∂L
∂si
=
∂U
∂Gi
+ β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
∂U
∂Gm
+ λ = 0 ∀i (A.18)
∂L
∂T
= −
n∑
i=1
∂U
∂ci
− λn = 0 (A.19)
∂L
∂λ
=
n∑
i=1
si − nT = 0 . (A.20)
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Using (A.18) for i and j 6= i, combining and imposing symmetry yields (37). Combining (A.18)
and (A.19) yields (38).
Taking the partial derivative of the first-order conditions with respect to ti (which is a
parameter from the point of view of the central government) gives
(
1 + β(n− 1))UGG∂Gi
∂ti
= 0 ∀i (A.21)
− UCC ∂ci
∂ti
= 0 (A.22)
∂si
∂ti
= n
∂T
∂ti
− (n− 1)∂sj
∂ti
, (A.23)
where UGG ≡ ∂2U∂G2i and UCC ≡
∂2U
∂c2i
. Equation (A.21) can be rewritten such that ∂Gi
∂ti
=
∂Gj
∂ti
(differentiating (37) with respect to ti would be an alternative to derive the same expression):
∂tiki
∂ti
+
∂si
∂ti
+ β
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
(
∂ tjkj
∂ti
+
∂sj
∂ti
)
=
∂tjkj
∂ti
+
∂sj
∂ti
+ β
(
∂tiki
∂ti
+
∂si
∂ti
)
+ β
n∑
m=1
m6=j
(
∂ tmkm
∂ti
+
∂sm
∂ti
)
∂tiki
∂ti
+
∂si
∂ti
+ β(n− 1)
(
∂ tjkj
∂ti
+
∂sj
∂ti
)
=
(
1 + β(n− 2))(∂tjkj
∂ti
+
∂sj
∂ti
)
+ β
(
∂tiki
∂ti
+
∂si
∂ti
)
(1− β)
(
∂tiki
∂ti
+
∂si
∂ti
)
= (1− β)
(
∂tjkj
∂ti
+
∂sj
∂ti
)
,
where symmetry is applied in the second line. Substituting (A.23), we get:
(1− β)∂sj
∂ti
= (1− β)
(
n
∂T
∂ti
− (n− 1)∂sj
∂ti
+
∂tiki
∂ti
− ∂tjkj
∂ti
)
.
Solving for ∂si
∂ti
and
∂sj
∂ti
, results in the reaction functions
(1− β)∂si
∂ti
= (1− β)
(
n− 1
n
(
∂tjkj
∂ti
− ∂tiki
∂ti
)
+
∂T
∂ti
)
(1− β)∂sj
∂ti
= (1− β)
(
∂T
∂ti
+
1
n
(
∂tiki
∂ti
− ∂tjkj
∂ti
))
,
which simplifies to (39) for β < 1.
In stage 1, the regional governments maximize regional utility incorporating the reaction of
40
the federal policy to their tax increase:
max
Gi,gi,ci,ti
U(ci, Gi) s.t. Gi = gi + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
gm
gi = tiki + si
ci = f(ki)− f ′(ki)ki + k¯iR− T
ti ≥ 0
with si = si(ti, tj); sj = sj(ti, tj); T = T (ti, tj) .
Corollary 1
In stage 2, the maximization problem of the federal government using a gross transfer system
as defined by part i, is:
max
{G1...n},{s1...n},{T1...n},{g1...n},{c1...n}
n∑
i=1
Ui(ci, Gi) s.t. Gi = gi + β
n∑
m=1
m6=i
gm (A.24)
n∑
i=1
si =
n∑
i=1
Ti
gi = tiki + si
ci = f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki + k¯iR− Ti .
The Lagrangian and the FOCs are:
max
{s1...n},{T1...n}
L =
n∑
i=1
Ui
(
f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki + k¯iR− Ti, tiki + si + β
n∑
m=1
m6=i
tmkm + sm
)
+ λ(
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
Ti) (A.25)
∂L
∂si
=
∂U
∂Gi
+ β
n∑
m=1
m6=i
∂U
∂Gm
+ λ = 0 ∀i (A.26)
∂L
∂Ti
= −∂U
∂ci
− λ = 0 ∀i (A.27)
∂L
∂λ
=
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
Ti = 0. (A.28)
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Combining will lead to the same optimality conditions as in 4.1.2, i.e. (33) and (34).
The problem for part ii, after substituting the budget constraints, is given by:
max
{s1...n},{τ1...n},T
L =Ui
f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki + k¯iR + τi − T, tiki + si + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
tmkm + sm

(A.29)
+
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
Uj
f(kj)− ∂f(kj)
∂kj
kj + k¯jR + τj − T, tjkj + sj + β
n∑
m=1
m 6=j
tmkm + sm

+ λ(
n∑
i=1
si − nT )
+ µ(
n∑
i=1
τi)
The first order conditions are given by:
∂L
∂si
=
∂U
∂Gi
+ β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
∂U
∂Gm
+ λ = 0 ∀i (A.30)
∂L
∂T
= −
n∑
i=1
∂U
∂ci
− λn = 0 (A.31)
∂L
∂τi
=
∂U
∂ci
+ µ = 0 ∀i (A.32)
∂L
∂λ
=
n∑
i=1
si − nT = 0 (A.33)
∂L
∂µ
=
n∑
i=1
τi = 0 . (A.34)
Combining leads to:
U ′(Gi) = U ′(Gj) ⇒ Gi = Gj ∀ i, j , (A.35)
U ′(ci) = U ′(cj) ⇒ ci = cj ∀ i, j , (A.36)
∂U
∂Gi
∂U
∂ci
≡MRSi = 1
1 + (n− 1)β (A.37)
in symmetry. Using (A.30) for region i and j results in (A.35). Likewise, using (A.32) for i and
j leads to (A.36). Combining (A.30) with (A.31) establishes (A.37).
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The federal government chooses transfers si and τi such that the marginal utilities of private
and public consumption across regions are equalized, which implies equal private and public
good consumption across regions in symmetry. These two conditions suffice to establish an
efficient solution as demonstrated in 4.1.2. The same is true if we concentrate on the first-
order condition for T instead. Given that this problem has one redundant instrument, and
that regions are ex-ante symmetric, the regional tax rates ti = tj = t are not identified in
this equilibrium. If regional taxes are doubled, then the transfers would simply be cut in half,
leaving public and private consumption unchanged as defined by (A.35)-(A.37). Without loss
of generality, we can therefore set ti to zero for all regions, or to any other value.
A.3 Centralized leadership
Starting in stage 2, the regional governments’ problem is given by
max
Gi,gi,ci,ti
Ui (ci, Gi)
s. t. gi =
tiki
1− α
ci = f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki + k¯iR− T
Gi = gi + β
n∑
m=1
m6=i
gm.
The optimality condition from combining the first order conditions results in (A.2). When
regional governments maximize regional utility, the marginal effect of taxes on consumption
(income) is equivalent to the effect in the Nash game:
∂ci
∂ti
= −f ′′(ki)∂ki
∂ti
ki +
∂R
∂ti
k¯i . (A.38)
The marginal effect of taxes on public consumption is given by:
∂Gi
∂ti
=
1
1− α
(
ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
+ β
n∑
m=1
m 6=i
∂tmkm
∂ti
)
. (A.39)
Using (A.38) and (A.39) in the MRS (A.2) gives
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MRSCEi =
f ′′(ki)∂ki∂ti ki − ∂R∂ti k¯i
1
1−α [ki +
∂ki
∂ti
ti] + β
∑n
m=1
m6=i
∂km
∂ti
tm
. (A.40)
In symmetry and incorporating the reaction of the capital market given by (10), (A.40)
becomes the optimality condition for the regions’ problem:
MRSCE =
1− α
1 + (1− β)(n−1
n
) 1
f”(k)
t
k
. (A.41)
In stage 1, substituting all budget constraints (households, regional and federal govern-
ments) and the definition for Gi, the federal government chooses α to maximize
max
α
n∑
i=1
Ui
f(ki)− ∂f(ki)
∂ki
ki + k¯iR− α
n
n∑
i=1
gi;
tiki
1− α + β
n∑
m=1
m6=i
tmkm
1− α
 , (A.42)
which is
∂Ui
∂ci
n∑
i=1
(
− 1
n
tiki
1− α −
α
n
tiki
(1− α)2
)
+
∂Ui
∂Gi
(
tiki
(1− α)2 + β
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
tjkj
(1− α)2
)
+
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
∂Uj
∂cj
n∑
j=1
(
− 1
n
tjkj
1− α −
α
n
tjkj
(1− α)2
)
+
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
∂Uj
∂Gj
tjkj
(1− α)2 + β
n∑
m=1
m6=j
tmkm
(1− α)2 = 0 .
Multiplying by 1
(1−α)2 , simplifying, imposing symmetry and collecting terms gives us in sym-
metry:
MRSCE =
1
1 + (n− 1)β = MRS
PO . (A.43)
which is equivalent to the social optimum in (14).
Proof of Proposition 4:
(i) When treating si as a lump-sum transfer rather than a matching grant, the transfer
drops out of regions’ first-order conditions, and the resulting equilibrium is characterized by
expression (21) and thus identical to the Nash equilibrium.
(ii) In order to induce Pareto-efficiency, the federal government sets the matching rate α such
44
that (A.41) and (A.43) are equalized:
1− α
1 + (1− β)(n−1
n
) 1
f”(k)
t
k
=
1
1 + (n− 1)β .
Solving for α results in
αCE =
n− 1
n
·
nβ + (1− β) 1−f”(k) tk
1 + (n− 1)β
=
(n− 1)β + (1− β)
1 + (n− 1)β , (A.44)
with  ≡ n−1
n
1
−f ′′(ki)
t
k
(iii) The derivative of the matching rate w.r.t. the spillover parameter is given by:
∂αCE
∂β
=
(n− 1)(1 + 1
f”(k)
t
k
)
(1 + (n− 1)β)2 . (A.45)
Provided that n > 1, it follows that for 1|f”(k)|
t
k
< 1, ∂αCE/∂β > 0, and vice versa. 
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